INTERNET-DRAFT ECC Keys in the DNS
Expires: January 2006 July 2005
Elliptic Curve KEYs in the DNS
-------- ----- ---- -- --- ---
Richard C. Schroeppel
Donald Eastlake 3rd
Status of This Document
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have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
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Abstract
The standard method for storing elliptic curve cryptographic keys and
signatures in the Domain Name System is specified.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005). All Rights Reserved.
R. Schroeppel, et al [Page 1]
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Acknowledgement
The assistance of Hilarie K. Orman in the production of this document
is greatfully acknowledged.
Table of Contents
Status of This Document....................................1
Abstract...................................................1
Copyright Notice...........................................1
Acknowledgement............................................2
Table of Contents..........................................2
1. Introduction............................................3
2. Elliptic Curve Data in Resource Records.................3
3. The Elliptic Curve Equation.............................9
4. How do I Compute Q, G, and Y?..........................10
5. Elliptic Curve SIG Resource Records....................11
6. Performance Considerations.............................13
7. Security Considerations................................13
8. IANA Considerations....................................13
Copyright and Disclaimer..................................14
Informational References..................................15
Normative Refrences.......................................15
Author's Addresses........................................16
Expiration and File Name..................................16
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1. Introduction
The Domain Name System (DNS) is the global hierarchical replicated
distributed database system for Internet addressing, mail proxy, and
other information. The DNS has been extended to include digital
signatures and cryptographic keys as described in [RFC 4033, 4034,
4035].
This document describes how to store elliptic curve cryptographic
(ECC) keys and signatures in the DNS so they can be used for a
variety of security purposes. Familiarity with ECC cryptography is
assumed [Menezes].
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC 2119].
2. Elliptic Curve Data in Resource Records
Elliptic curve public keys are stored in the DNS within the RDATA
portions of key RRs, such as RRKEY and KEY [RFC 4034] RRs, with the
structure shown below.
The research world continues to work on the issue of which is the
best elliptic curve system, which finite field to use, and how to
best represent elements in the field. So, representations are
defined for every type of finite field, and every type of elliptic
curve. The reader should be aware that there is a unique finite
field with a particular number of elements, but many possible
representations of that field and its elements. If two different
representations of a field are given, they are interconvertible with
a tedious but practical precomputation, followed by a fast
computation for each field element to be converted. It is perfectly
reasonable for an algorithm to work internally with one field
representation, and convert to and from a different external
representation.
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1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|S M -FMT- A B Z|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| LP |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| P (length determined from LP) .../
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| LF |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| F (length determined from LF) .../
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| DEG |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| DEGH |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| DEGI |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| DEGJ |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| TRDV |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|S| LH |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| H (length determined from LH) .../
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|S| LK |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| K (length determined from LK) .../
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| LQ |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Q (length determined from LQ) .../
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| LA |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| A (length determined from LA) .../
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| ALTA |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| LB |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| B (length determined from LB) .../
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| LC |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| C (length determined from LC) .../
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| LG |
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+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| G (length determined from LG) .../
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| LY |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Y (length determined from LY) .../
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
SMFMTABZ is a flags octet as follows:
S = 1 indicates that the remaining 7 bits of the octet selects
one of 128 predefined choices of finite field, element
representation, elliptic curve, and signature parameters.
MFMTABZ are omitted, as are all parameters from LP through G.
LY and Y are retained.
If S = 0, the remaining parameters are as in the picture and
described below.
M determines the type of field underlying the elliptic curve.
M = 0 if the field is a GF[2^N] field;
M = 1 if the field is a (mod P) or GF[P^D] field with P>2.
FMT is a three bit field describing the format of the field
representation.
FMT = 0 for a (mod P) field.
> 0 for an extension field, either GF[2^D] or GF[P^D].
The degree D of the extension, and the field polynomial
must be specified. The field polynomial is always monic
(leading coefficient 1.)
FMT = 1 The field polynomial is given explicitly; D is implied.
If FMT >=2, the degree D is given explicitly.
= 2 The field polynomial is implicit.
= 3 The field polynomial is a binomial. P>2.
= 4 The field polynomial is a trinomial.
= 5 The field polynomial is the quotient of a trinomial by a
short polynomial. P=2.
= 6 The field polynomial is a pentanomial. P=2.
Flags A and B apply to the elliptic curve parameters.
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A = 1 When P>=5, the curve parameter A is negated. If P=2, then
A=1 indicates that the A parameter is special. See the
ALTA parameter below, following A. The combination A=1,
P=3 is forbidden.
B = 1 When P>=5, the curve parameter B is negated. If P=2 or 3,
then B=1 indicates an alternate elliptic curve equation is
used. When P=2 and B=1, an additional curve parameter C
is present.
The Z bit SHOULD be set to zero on creation of an RR and MUST be
ignored when processing an RR (when S=0).
Most of the remaining parameters are present in some formats and
absent in others. The presence or absence of a parameter is
determined entirely by the flags. When a parameter occurs, it is in
the order defined by the picture.
Of the remaining parameters, PFHKQABCGY are variable length. When
present, each is preceded by a one-octet length field as shown in the
diagram above. The length field does not include itself. The length
field may have values from 0 through 110. The parameter length in
octets is determined by a conditional formula: If LL<=64, the
parameter length is LL. If LL>64, the parameter length is 16 times
(LL-60). In some cases, a parameter value of 0 is sensible, and MAY
be represented by an LL value of 0, with the data field omitted. A
length value of 0 represents a parameter value of 0, not an absent
parameter. (The data portion occupies 0 space.) There is no
requirement that a parameter be represented in the minimum number of
octets; high-order 0 octets are allowed at the front end. Parameters
are always right adjusted, in a field of length defined by LL. The
octet-order is always most-significant first, least-significant last.
The parameters H and K may have an optional sign bit stored in the
unused high-order bit of their length fields.
LP defines the length of the prime P. P must be an odd prime. The
parameters LP,P are present if and only if the flag M=1. If M=0, the
prime is 2.
LF,F define an explicit field polynomial. This parameter pair is
present only when FMT = 1. The length of a polynomial coefficient is
ceiling(log2 P) bits. Coefficients are in the numerical range
[0,P-1]. The coefficients are packed into fixed-width fields, from
higher order to lower order. All coefficients must be present,
including any 0s and also the leading coefficient (which is required
to be 1). The coefficients are right justified into the octet string
of length specified by LF, with the low-order "constant" coefficient
at the right end. As a concession to storage efficiency, the higher
order bits of the leading coefficient may be elided, discarding high-
order 0 octets and reducing LF. The degree is calculated by
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determining the bit position of the left most 1-bit in the F data
(counting the right most bit as position 0), and dividing by
ceiling(log2 P). The division must be exact, with no remainder. In
this format, all of the other degree and field parameters are
omitted. The next parameters will be LQ,Q.
If FMT>=2, the degree of the field extension is specified explicitly,
usually along with other parameters to define the field polynomial.
DEG is a two octet field that defines the degree of the field
extension. The finite field will have P^DEG elements. DEG is
present when FMT>=2.
When FMT=2, the field polynomial is specified implicitly. No other
parameters are required to define the field; the next parameters
present will be the LQ,Q pair. The implicit field poynomial is the
lexicographically smallest irreducible (mod P) polynomial of the
correct degree. The ordering of polynomials is by highest-degree
coefficients first -- the leading coefficient 1 is most important,
and the constant term is least important. Coefficients are ordered
by sign-magnitude: 0 < 1 < -1 < 2 < -2 < ... The first polynomial of
degree D is X^D (which is not irreducible). The next is X^D+1, which
is sometimes irreducible, followed by X^D-1, which isn't. Assuming
odd P, this series continues to X^D - (P-1)/2, and then goes to X^D +
X, X^D + X + 1, X^D + X - 1, etc.
When FMT=3, the field polynomial is a binomial, X^DEG + K. P must be
odd. The polynomial is determined by the degree and the low order
term K. Of all the field parameters, only the LK,K parameters are
present. The high-order bit of the LK octet stores on optional sign
for K; if the sign bit is present, the field polynomial is X^DEG - K.
When FMT=4, the field polynomial is a trinomial, X^DEG + H*X^DEGH +
K. When P=2, the H and K parameters are implicitly 1, and are
omitted from the representation. Only DEG and DEGH are present; the
next parameters are LQ,Q. When P>2, then LH,H and LK,K are
specified. Either or both of LH, LK may contain a sign bit for its
parameter.
When FMT=5, then P=2 (only). The field polynomial is the exact
quotient of a trinomial divided by a small polynomial, the trinomial
divisor. The small polynomial is right-adjusted in the two octet
field TRDV. DEG specifies the degree of the field. The degree of
TRDV is calculated from the position of the high-order 1 bit. The
trinomial to be divided is X^(DEG+degree(TRDV)) + X^DEGH + 1. If
DEGH is 0, the middle term is omitted from the trinomial. The
quotient must be exact, with no remainder.
When FMT=6, then P=2 (only). The field polynomial is a pentanomial,
with the degrees of the middle terms given by the three 2-octet
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values DEGH, DEGI, DEGJ. The polynomial is X^DEG + X^DEGH + X^DEGI +
X^DEGJ + 1. The values must satisfy the inequality DEG > DEGH > DEGI
> DEGJ > 0.
DEGH, DEGI, DEGJ are two-octet fields that define the degree of
a term in a field polynomial. DEGH is present when FMT = 4,
5, or 6. DEGI and DEGJ are present only when FMT = 6.
TRDV is a two-octet right-adjusted binary polynomial of degree <
16. It is present only for FMT=5.
LH and H define the H parameter, present only when FMT=4 and P
is odd. The high bit of LH is an optional sign bit for H.
LK and K define the K parameter, present when FMT = 3 or 4, and
P is odd. The high bit of LK is an optional sign bit for K.
The remaining parameters are concerned with the elliptic curve and
the signature algorithm.
LQ defines the length of the prime Q. Q is a prime > 2^159.
In all 5 of the parameter pairs LA+A,LB+B,LC+C,LG+G,LY+Y, the data
member of the pair is an element from the finite field defined
earlier. The length field defines a long octet string. Field
elements are represented as (mod P) polynomials of degree < DEG, with
DEG or fewer coefficients. The coefficients are stored from left to
right, higher degree to lower, with the constant term last. The
coefficients are represented as integers in the range [0,P-1]. Each
coefficient is allocated an area of ceiling(log2 P) bits. The field
representation is right-justified; the "constant term" of the field
element ends at the right most bit. The coefficients are fitted
adjacently without regard for octet boundaries. (Example: if P=5,
three bits are used for each coefficient. If the field is GF[5^75],
then 225 bits are required for the coefficients, and as many as 29
octets may be needed in the data area. Fewer octets may be used if
some high-order coefficients are 0.) If a flag requires a field
element to be negated, each non-zero coefficient K is replaced with
P-K. To save space, 0 bits may be removed from the left end of the
element representation, and the length field reduced appropriately.
This would normally only happen with A,B,C, because the designer
chose curve parameters with some high-order 0 coefficients or bits.
If the finite field is simply (mod P), then the field elements are
simply numbers (mod P), in the usual right-justified notation. If
the finite field is GF[2^D], the field elements are the usual right-
justified polynomial basis representation.
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LA,A is the first parameter of the elliptic curve equation.
When P>=5, the flag A = 1 indicates A should be negated (mod
P). When P=2 (indicated by the flag M=0), the flag A = 1
indicates that the parameter pair LA,A is replaced by the two
octet parameter ALTA. In this case, the parameter A in the
curve equation is x^ALTA, where x is the field generator.
Parameter A often has the value 0, which may be indicated by
LA=0 (with no A data field), and sometimes A is 1, which may
be represented with LA=1 and a data field of 1, or by setting
the A flag and using an ALTA value of 0.
LB,B is the second parameter of the elliptic curve equation.
When P>=5, the flag B = 1 indicates B should be negated (mod
P). When P=2 or 3, the flag B selects an alternate curve
equation.
LC,C is the third parameter of the elliptic curve equation,
present only when P=2 (indicated by flag M=0) and flag B=1.
LG,G defines a point on the curve, of order Q. The W-coordinate
of the curve point is given explicitly; the Z-coordinate is
implicit.
LY,Y is the user's public signing key, another curve point of
order Q. The W-coordinate is given explicitly; the Z-
coordinate is implicit. The LY,Y parameter pair is always
present.
3. The Elliptic Curve Equation
(The coordinates of an elliptic curve point are named W,Z instead of
the more usual X,Y to avoid confusion with the Y parameter of the
signing key.)
The elliptic curve equation is determined by the flag octet, together
with information about the prime P. The primes 2 and 3 are special;
all other primes are treated identically.
If M=1, the (mod P) or GF[P^D] case, the curve equation is Z^2 = W^3
+ A*W + B. Z,W,A,B are all numbers (mod P) or elements of GF[P^D].
If A and/or B is negative (i.e., in the range from P/2 to P), and
P>=5, space may be saved by putting the sign bit(s) in the A and B
bits of the flags octet, and the magnitude(s) in the parameter
fields.
If M=1 and P=3, the B flag has a different meaning: it specifies an
alternate curve equation, Z^2 = W^3 + A*W^2 + B. The middle term of
the right-hand-side is different. When P=3, this equation is more
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commonly used.
If M=0, the GF[2^N] case, the curve equation is Z^2 + W*Z = W^3 +
A*W^2 + B. Z,W,A,B are all elements of the field GF[2^N]. The A
parameter can often be 0 or 1, or be chosen as a single-1-bit value.
The flag B is used to select an alternate curve equation, Z^2 + C*Z =
W^3 + A*W + B. This is the only time that the C parameter is used.
4. How do I Compute Q, G, and Y?
The number of points on the curve is the number of solutions to the
curve equation, + 1 (for the "point at infinity"). The prime Q must
divide the number of points. Usually the curve is chosen first, then
the number of points is determined with Schoof's algorithm. This
number is factored, and if it has a large prime divisor, that number
is taken as Q.
G must be a point of order Q on the curve, satisfying the equation
Q * G = the point at infinity (on the elliptic curve)
G may be chosen by selecting a random [RFC 1750] curve point, and
multiplying it by (number-of-points-on-curve/Q). G must not itself
be the "point at infinity"; in this astronomically unlikely event, a
new random curve point is recalculated.
G is specified by giving its W-coordinate. The Z-coordinate is
calculated from the curve equation. In general, there will be two
possible Z values. The rule is to choose the "positive" value.
In the (mod P) case, the two possible Z values sum to P. The smaller
value is less than P/2; it is used in subsequent calculations. In
GF[P^D] fields, the highest-degree non-zero coefficient of the field
element Z is used; it is chosen to be less than P/2.
In the GF[2^N] case, the two possible Z values xor to W (or to the
parameter C with the alternate curve equation). The numerically
smaller Z value (the one which does not contain the highest-order 1
bit of W (or C)) is used in subsequent calculations.
Y is specified by giving the W-coordinate of the user's public
signature key. The Z-coordinate value is determined from the curve
equation. As with G, there are two possible Z values; the same rule
is followed for choosing which Z to use.
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During the key generation process, a random [RFC 1750] number X must
be generated such that 1 <= X <= Q-1. X is the private key and is
used in the final step of public key generation where Y is computed
as
Y = X * G (as points on the elliptic curve)
If the Z-coordinate of the computed point Y is wrong (i.e., Z > P/2
in the (mod P) case, or the high-order non-zero coefficient of Z >
P/2 in the GF[P^D] case, or Z sharing a high bit with W(C) in the
GF[2^N] case), then X must be replaced with Q-X. This will
correspond to the correct Z-coordinate.
5. Elliptic Curve SIG Resource Records
The signature portion of an RR RDATA area when using the EC
algorithm, for example in the RRSIG and SIG [RFC records] RRs is
shown below.
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| R, (length determined from LQ) .../
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| S, (length determined from LQ) .../
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
R and S are integers (mod Q). Their length is specified by the LQ
field of the corresponding KEY RR and can also be calculated from the
SIG RR's RDLENGTH. They are right justified, high-order-octet first.
The same conditional formula for calculating the length from LQ is
used as for all the other length fields above.
The data signed is determined as specified in [RFC 2535]. Then the
following steps are taken where Q, P, G, and Y are as specified in
the public key [Schneier]:
hash = SHA-1 ( data )
Generate random [RFC 4086] K such that 0 < K < Q. (Never sign two
different messages with the same K. K should be chosen from a
very large space: If an opponent learns a K value for a single
signature, the user's signing key is compromised, and a forger
can sign arbitrary messages. There is no harm in signing the
same message multiple times with the same key or different
keys.)
R = (the W-coordinate of ( K*G on the elliptic curve )) interpreted
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as an integer, and reduced (mod Q). (R must not be 0. In
this astronomically unlikely event, generate a new random K
and recalculate R.)
S = ( K^(-1) * (hash + X*R) ) mod Q.
S must not be 0. In this astronomically unlikely event, generate a
new random K and recalculate R and S.
If S > Q/2, set S = Q - S.
The pair (R,S) is the signature.
Another party verifies the signature as follows:
Check that 0 < R < Q and 0 < S < Q/2. If not, it can not be a
valid EC sigature.
hash = SHA-1 ( data )
Sinv = S^(-1) mod Q.
U1 = (hash * Sinv) mod Q.
U2 = (R * Sinv) mod Q.
(U1 * G + U2 * Y) is computed on the elliptic curve.
V = (the W-coordinate of this point) interpreted as an integer
and reduced (mod Q).
The signature is valid if V = R.
The reason for requiring S < Q/2 is that, otherwise, both (R,S) and
(R,Q-S) would be valid signatures for the same data. Note that a
signature that is valid for hash(data) is also valid for
hash(data)+Q or hash(data)-Q, if these happen to fall in the range
[0,2^160-1]. It's believed to be computationally infeasible to
find data that hashes to an assigned value, so this is only a
cosmetic blemish. The blemish can be eliminated by using Q >
2^160, at the cost of having slightly longer signatures, 42 octets
instead of 40.
We must specify how a field-element E ("the W-coordinate") is to be
interpreted as an integer. The field-element E is regarded as a
radix-P integer, with the digits being the coefficients in the
polynomial basis representation of E. The digits are in the ragne
[0,P-1]. In the two most common cases, this reduces to "the
obvious thing". In the (mod P) case, E is simply a residue mod P,
and is taken as an integer in the range [0,P-1]. In the GF[2^D]
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case, E is in the D-bit polynomial basis representation, and is
simply taken as an integer in the range [0,(2^D)-1]. For other
fields GF[P^D], it's necessary to do some radix conversion
arithmetic.
6. Performance Considerations
Elliptic curve signatures use smaller moduli or field sizes than
RSA and DSA. Creation of a curve is slow, but not done very often.
Key generation is faster than RSA or DSA.
DNS implementations have been optimized for small transfers,
typically less than 512 octets including DNS overhead. Larger
transfers will perform correctly and and extensions have been
standardized to make larger transfers more efficient [RFC 2671].
However, it is still advisable at this time to make reasonable
efforts to minimize the size of RR sets stored within the DNS
consistent with adequate security.
7. Security Considerations
Keys retrieved from the DNS should not be trusted unless (1) they
have been securely obtained from a secure resolver or independently
verified by the user and (2) this secure resolver and secure
obtainment or independent verification conform to security policies
acceptable to the user. As with all cryptographic algorithms,
evaluating the necessary strength of the key is essential and
dependent on local policy.
Some specific key generation considerations are given in the body
of this document.
8. IANA Considerations
The key and signature data structures defined herein correspond to
the value 4 in the Algorithm number field of the IANA registry
Assignment of meaning to the remaining ECC data flag bits or to
values of ECC fields outside the ranges for which meaning in
defined in this document requires an IETF consensus as defined in
[RFC 2434].
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Copyright and Disclaimer
Copyright (C) The Internet Society 2005. This document is subject
to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78, and
except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights.
This document and the information contained herein are provided on
an "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE
REPRESENTS OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND
THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES,
EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT
THE USE OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR
ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A
PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
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Informational References
[RFC 1034] - P. Mockapetris, "Domain names - concepts and
facilities", 11/01/1987.
[RFC 1035] - P. Mockapetris, "Domain names - implementation and
specification", 11/01/1987.
[RFC 2671] - P. Vixie, "Extension Mechanisms for DNS (EDNS0)",
August 1999.
[RFC 4033] - Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and
S. Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements", RFC 4033,
March 2005.
[RFC 4035] - Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and
S. Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security Extensions",
RFC 4035, March 2005.
[RFC 4086] - Eastlake, D., 3rd, Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
"Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086, June
2005.
[Schneier] - Bruce Schneier, "Applied Cryptography: Protocols,
Algorithms, and Source Code in C", 1996, John Wiley and Sons
[Menezes] - Alfred Menezes, "Elliptic Curve Public Key
Cryptosystems", 1993 Kluwer.
[Silverman] - Joseph Silverman, "The Arithmetic of Elliptic
Curves", 1986, Springer Graduate Texts in mathematics #106.
Normative Refrences
[RFC 2119] - S. Bradner, "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", March 1997.
[RFC 2434] - T. Narten, H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", October 1998.
[RFC 4034] - Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and
S. Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions", RFC
4034, March 2005.
R. Schroeppel, et al [Page 15]
INTERNET-DRAFT ECC Keys in the DNS
Author's Addresses
Rich Schroeppel
500 S. Maple Drive
Woodland Hills, UT 84653 USA
Telephone: +1-505-844-9079(w)
Email: rschroe@sandia.gov
Donald E. Eastlake 3rd
Motorola Laboratories
155 Beaver Street
Milford, MA 01757 USA
Telephone: +1 508-786-7554 (w)
EMail: Donald.Eastlake@motorola.com
Expiration and File Name
This draft expires in January 2006.
Its file name is draft-ietf-dnsext-ecc-key-07.txt.
R. Schroeppel, et al [Page 16]