Internet-Draft DVS for JOSE August 2024
Bastian & Kraus Expires 10 February 2025 [Page]
Workgroup:
Javascript Object Signing and Encryption
Internet-Draft:
draft-bastian-dvs-jose-01
Published:
Intended Status:
Informational
Expires:
Authors:
P. Bastian
Bundesdruckerei GmbH
M. Kraus
Bundesdruckerei GmbH

Designated Verifier Signatures for JOSE

Abstract

This specification defines designated verifier signatures for JOSE and defines algorithms that use a combination of key agreement and MACs.

About This Document

This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

The latest revision of this draft can be found at https://paulbastian.github.io/draft-bastian-dvs-jose/draft-bastian-dvs-jose.html. Status information for this document may be found at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-bastian-dvs-jose/.

Discussion of this document takes place on the Javascript Object Signing and Encryption Working Group mailing list (mailto:jose@ietf.org), which is archived at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/jose/. Subscribe at https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose/.

Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at https://github.com/paulbastian/draft-bastian-dvs-jose.

Status of This Memo

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This Internet-Draft will expire on 10 February 2025.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction

Designated verifier signatures (DVS) are signature schemes in which signatures are generated, that can only be verified a particular party. Unlike conventional digital signature schemes like ECDSA, this enables repudiable signatures.

This specification describes a general structure for designated verifier signature schemes and specified a set of instantiations that use a combination of an ECDH key exchange with an HMAC.

This specification and all described algorithms should respect the efforts for Fully Specified Algorithms.

This algorithm is intended for use with digital credentials ecosystems, including the Issuer-Holder-Verifier model described by W3C VCDM or IETF SD-JWT-VC.

2. Conventions and Definitions

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

3. Terminology

The draft uses "JSON Web Signature", "JOSE Header", "JWS Signature", "JWS Signing Input" as defined by [RFC7515].

Signing Party:

The Party that performs the key agreement first and generates the MAC. Similar to a Signer.

Verifying Party:

The Party that performs the key agreement second, generates the MAC and compares it to a given value. Similar to a Verifier.

4. Cryptographic Dependencies

DVS rely on the following primitives:

5. Designated Verifier Signatures

A designated verifier signature requires three components for an algorithm:

  1. a Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement (DHKA)

  2. a Key Derivation Function (KDF)

  3. a Message Authentication Code algorithm (MAC)

In general, these parameters are chosen by the Signing Party. These parameters need to be communicated to the Verifying Party before the generation of a Designated Verifier Signature.

The following functions are defined to describe a generic, composable Designated Verifier Signature Scheme:

def dvsSign(pkR, skS, msg, salt= "", info = "DVS-1")
   dh =  DH(skS, pkR)
   prk = Extract(salt, dh)
   k = Expand(prk, info, Nk)
   mac = MacSign(k, msg)
   return mac

def dvsVerify(skR, pkS, msg, salt = "", info = "DVS-1", mac)
   dh =  DH(skR, pkS)
   prk = Extract(salt, dh)
   k = Expand(prk, info, Nk)
   mac' = MacSign(k, msg)
   if mac != mac':
      raise Exception("Designated Verifier Signature invalid")
   return

5.1. Signature Generation

The generation of the Designated Verifier Signature takes the private key of the Signing Party, the public key of the Verifying Party and the message as inputs. The retrieval and communication of the Verifying Party's public key is out of scope of this specification and subject to the implementing protocols.

Input:

  • skS: private key of the Signing Party

  • pkR: public key of the Verifying Party

  • msg: JWS Signing Input

  • salt : Salt for key derivation

  • info : optional info for key derivation

Steps: * TODO

5.2. Signature Verification

The generation of the Designated Verifier Signature takes the private key of the Signing Party, the public key of the Verifying Party and the message as inputs. The retrieval and communication of the Verifying Party's public key is out of scope of this specification and subject to the implementing protocols.

Input:

  • skR: private key of the Verifying Party

  • pkS: public key of the Signing Party

  • msg: JWS Signing Input

  • salt : Salt for key derivation

  • info : optional info for key derivation

  • signature : the Message Authentication Code

Steps: * TODO

5.3. Signature Suites

Algorithms MUST follow the naming DVS-<DHKA>-<KDF>-<MAC>.

6. Designated Verifier Signatures using HPKE

This section describes a simple designated verifier signature scheme based on Hybrid Public Key Encryption (HPKE) [RFC9180] in auth mode. It reuses the authentication scheme underlying the AEAD algorithm in use, while using the KEM to establish a one-time authentication key from a pair of KEM public keys. This scheme was described in early specification drafts of HPKE [RFC9180]

6.1. Signature Generation

To create a signature, the sender simply calls the single-shot Seal() method with an empty plaintext value and the message to be signed as AAD. This produces an encoded key enc and a ciphertext value that contains only the AAD tag. The signature value is the concatenation of the encoded key and the AAD tag.

Input:

  • skS: private key of the Signing Party

  • pkR: public key of the Verifying Party

  • msg: JWS Signing Input

  • info : optional info for key derivation

Steps:

  1. Call enc, ct = SealAuth(pkR, info, aad, pt, skS) with

    • aad = msg

    • pt = ""

  2. JWS Signature is the octet string concatenation of (enc || ct)

6.2. Signature Verification

To verify a signature, the recipient extracts encoded key and the AAD tag from the signature value and calls the single-shor Open() with the provided ciphertext. If the AEAD authentication passes, then the signature is valid.

Input:

  • skR: private key of the Verifying Party

  • pkS: public key of the Signing Party

  • msg: JWS Signing Input

  • info : optional info for key derivation

  • signature: JWS Signature octet string

Steps:

  1. Decode enc || ct = signature by length of enc and ct. See [HPKE-IANA] for length of ct and enc.

  2. Call pt = OpenAuth(enc, skR, info, aad, ct, pkS) with

    • aad = msg

  3. the signature is valid, when OpenAuth() returns pt = "" with no authentication exception

NOTE: ct contains only a tag. It's length depends on the AEAD algorithm (see Nt values in RFC9180 chapter 7.3.)

6.3. Signature Suites

Algorithms MUST follow the naming DVS-HPKE-<Mode>-<KEM>-<KDF>-<AEAD>. "Mode" is Auth (PSKAuth could also be used). The "KEM", "KDF", and "AEAD" values are chosen from the HPKE IANA registry [HPKE-IANA].

7. Designated Verifier Signatures for JOSE

Designated Verifier Signatures behave like a digital signature as described in Section 3 of [RFC7518] and are intended for use in JSON Web Signatures (JWS) as described in [RFC7515]. The Generating Party performs the Message Signature or MAC Computation as defined by Section 5.1 of [RFC7515]. The Verifying Party performs the Message Signature or MAC Validation as defined by Section 5.2 of [RFC7515].

The following JWS headers are used to convey Designated Verifier Signatures for JOSE:

The Signing Party may use existing JWS header parameters like x5c, jwk or kid to represent or reference it's public key according to [RFC7517].

7.1. Example JWT

The JWT/JWS header:

{
    "typ" : "JWT",
    "alg" : "DVS-P256-SHA256-HS256",
    "jwk" : <JWK of the Signing Party>,
    "rpk" : <JWK of Verifying Party>
}

The JWT/JWS payload:

{
    "iss" : "https://example.as.com",
    "iat" : "1701870613",
    "given_name" : "Erika",
    "family_name" : "Mustermann"
}

The JWT/JWS signature:

base64-encoded MAC

This specification described instantiations of Designated Verifier Signatures using specific algorithm combinations:

+-----------------------+-----------------------------+----------------+
| Algorithm Name        | Algorithm Description       |                |
|                       |                             | Requirements   |
+-----------------------+-----------------------------+----------------+
| DVS-P256-SHA256-HS256 | ECDH using NIST P-256,      | Optional       |
|                       | HKDF using SHA-256 and      |                |
|                       | HMAC using SHA-256          |                |
+-----------------------+-----------------------------+----------------+
| DVS-HPKE-Auth-X25519  | DVS based on HPKE using     |                |
| -SHA256               | DHKEM(X25519, HKDF-SHA256)  |   Optional     |
| -ChaCha20Poly1305     | HKDF-SHA256 KDF and         |                |
|                       | ChaCha20Poly1305 AEAD       |                |
+-----------------------+-----------------------------+----------------+
| DVS-HPKE-Auth-P256    | DVS based on HPKE using     |                |
| -SHA256-AES128GCM     | DHKEM(P-256, HKDF-SHA256)   |   Optional     |
|                       | HKDF-SHA256 KDF and         |                |
|                       | AES-128-GCM AEAD            |                |
+-----------------------+-----------------------------+----------------+

8. Security Considerations

8.1. Replay Attack Detection

  • Verifying Party MUST ensure the freshness of signatures by utilizing ephemeral keys in rpk or by providing a nonce for nonce.

9. IANA Considerations

Define:

10. References

10.1. Normative References

[RFC2119]
Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC7515]
Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7515>.
[RFC7517]
Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", RFC 7517, DOI 10.17487/RFC7517, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7517>.
[RFC7518]
Jones, M., "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)", RFC 7518, DOI 10.17487/RFC7518, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7518>.
[RFC8174]
Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
[RFC9180]
Barnes, R., Bhargavan, K., Lipp, B., and C. Wood, "Hybrid Public Key Encryption", RFC 9180, DOI 10.17487/RFC9180, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9180>.

10.2. Informative References

[HPKE-IANA]
"Hybrid Public Key Encryption (HPKE) IANA Registry", , <https://www.iana.org/assignments/hpke/hpke.xhtml>.

Appendix A. Acknowledgments

Thanks to:

Authors' Addresses

Paul Bastian
Bundesdruckerei GmbH
Micha Kraus
Bundesdruckerei GmbH